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“Never confuse movement with action.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal Endangered Species Act2 (ESA) is the “most 
celebrated and controversial biodiversity protection measure in the 
United States.”3 The ESA’s stated purposes are, inter alia, to conserve 
the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species 
depend and to provide a program for conserving endangered and 
threatened species.4 The ESA gives effect to these purposes in a 
number of ways, including requiring the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) to maintain a list of species determined to be 
endangered or threatened; requiring federal agencies to ensure that 
actions they carry out, fund, or approve “are not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any listed species or adversely modify or 
destroy its critical habitat”; and prohibiting all persons from taking 
animal species that are listed under the ESA.5 
Karuk Tribe of California v. United States Forest Service6 is the 
latest chapter in an ongoing legal fight regarding state and federal 
regulation of suction dredge mining across the West. Suction dredge 
mining, defined broadly, uses a motorized pump to vacuum up 
streambed material and wash that streambed material over a sluice 
 
1 A.E. HOTCHNER, PAPA HEMINGWAY 26 (1966) (attributing quote to Ernest 
Hemingway). 
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
3 HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
READINGS 330 (6th ed. 2012). 
4 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
5 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 3, at 330–31. 
6 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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box to capture gold or other valuable minerals.7 Peer-reviewed 
scientific literature has shown that suction dredge mining has the 
potential to harm endangered species and their habitat.8 In Karuk 
Tribe of California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit (Ninth Circuit)—sitting en banc—addressed two questions 
under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA in a challenge against the United 
States Forest Service’s regulation of suction dredge mining in a 
national forest.9 
This note proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the science on the 
harms of suction dredge mining to fish and other aquatic life. Part II 
explains the relevant background law and regulations. Part III 
discusses the facts and procedural history of the Karuk decision. Part 
IV summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions from the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc Karuk decision. Part V critically analyzes both 
Karuk en banc opinions. Finally, Part VI describes the implications of 
the en banc Karuk decision. 
I 
SCIENCE ON THE HARMS OF SUCTION DREDGE MINING TO FISH 
To suction dredge, a miner uses a gasoline-powered pump to 
vacuum material from the streambed through a flexible intake hose, 
which is commonly four or five inches in diameter.10 The diameter of 
this intake hose can be from two inches to ten inches or larger.11 A 
larger intake size allows a greater amount of streambed material to be 
vacuumed up and processed through the dredge per hour of 
operation.12 The suction dredge deposits water and streambed material 
into a floating sluice box.13 A sluice box is essentially a sloped 
channel with a textured bottom that catches and retains gold—which 
is especially dense—as water and streambed material move 
downslope along the sluice box.14 The suction dredge then discharges 
 
7 See id. at 1012. 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1011. 
10 Id. at 1012. 
11 How Do Suction Gold Dredges Work, GOLD FEVER PROSPECTING.COM, 
http://www.goldfeverprospecting.com/howdosugodrw.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
12 Id. 
13 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1012. 
14 Sluicing for Gold–Getting Started, GOLD FEVER PROSPECTING.COM, 
http://www.goldfeverprospecting.com/slforgogest.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
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the resulting spoil back into the stream or onto its bank when it 
reaches the end of the sluice box.15 
Suction dredge mining can have a number of harmful non-fishery 
effects, but this note focuses on the negative effects that the activity 
can have on coho salmon and other salmonids. If not properly 
regulated, suction dredge mining has the ability to jeopardize the 
continued existence of coho salmon and adversely modify its critical 
habitat. An overarching theme of the scientific literature on the effects 
of suction dredge mining is the need for additional studies on the 
environmental impacts of the activity.16 The effects of suction 
dredging “vary according to the size of stream, fish species present, 
season of dredging, and frequency and intensity of dredging.”17 This 
note first reviews the effects of suction dredging on spawning and 
early life stages of fishes, then the effects on juvenile and adult fishes, 
and finally the effects on stream benthic communities. This review of 
the potential harmful effects of suction dredging on fisheries and 
other aquatic life is primarily based off an expansive literature review 
completed by Horizon Water and Environment, LLC on behalf of the 
California Department of Fish and Wildlife in September 2009.18 The 
Oregon Chapter of the American Fisheries Society—which is 
“comprised of over 450 fisheries and aquatic science 
professionals”19—recently published a white paper that states the 
California Department of Fish and Wildlife literature review is, “[t]o 
date, the most complete literature review regarding impacts to fish 
and aquatic habitats from suction dredge mining” and largely supports 
the findings of that literature review.20 
 
15 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1012. 
16 See Peter B. Moyle, Suction Dredging is Bad for Fish, CAL. WATERBLOG (June 17, 
2011), http://californiawaterblog.com/2011/06/17/suction-dredging-is-bad-for-fish/ 
[hereinafter Moyle, Suction Dredging]. 
17 Id. 
18 Draft Subsequent Environmental Impact Report, Appendix D. Literature Review, 
CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, 4.3-1 (Sept. 2009), http://www 
.dfg.ca.gov/suctiondredge/. 
19 Letter from Jeffrey Yanke, President, Am. Fisheries Soc’y–Or. Chapter, to Oregon 
Legislature (Apr. 3, 2013), http://orafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-ORAFS       
-Suction-Dredge-Mining-Cover-Letter1.pdf. 
20 Effects of Suction Dredge Mining on Oregon Fishes and Aquatic Habitats, 
OR.CHAPTER AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y (Apr. 2013), http://orafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013 
/04/2013-ORAFS-Suction-Dredge-Mining-Impacts-FINAL1.pdf. 
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A. Fish Spawning and Early Life Stages 
Suction dredging operations can occur in the spawning habitat of 
many California salmonid species:21 a group that includes coho 
salmon.22 Salmonids need specific environmental conditions to 
successfully complete the spawning and incubation process.23 These 
conditions include proper depth, velocity, substrate, and complexity.24 
California salmonids spawn by digging a redd, also known as a nest, 
in stream or river substrate and depositing eggs into the redd; 
fertilization, incubation, hatching, and emergence take place in the 
redd.25 The optimum substrate for salmonid embryos is a mix of 
gravel and cobble with a mean diameter of one-half to four inches 
containing less than five percent fine particles—particles less than 
three-tenths of an inch in diameter.26 
1. Destabilization of Spawning Substrate 
Though a few studies have found that suction dredging increases 
the availability of spawning substrate by loosening compacted 
spawning gravels, most studies have found that the loose substrate 
frequently found in dredge tailings poses a threat to successful 
spawning.27 This threat is due to the relative instability of dredge 
tailings, which increases the chances of scouring and reduced survival 
of embryos.28 Further, salmonid embryo development frequently 
coincides with high-flow periods that cause scouring.29 Regardless, 
“the extent to which fish populations depend on dredge tailings for 
spawning habitat likely depends on the availability of suitable 
unaltered substrate and the quality of the dredge tailings.”30 
2. Increased Fine Particles in Spawning Substrate 
Salmonids require loose, uncompacted gravels with a high 
permeability and unclogged interstices for the removal of metabolic 
 
21 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 18. 
22 PETER B. MOYLE, INLAND FISHES OF CALIFORNIA 242–43, 245–46 (rev. & expanded 
ed. 2002). 
23 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 18, at 4.3-2. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 4.3-3. 
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wastes.31 The flow of water through the interstices of spawning 
substrate provides dissolved oxygen that is critical for the survival of 
developing salmonid eggs.32 Suction dredge mining can result in 
increased fine particles and organic matter in spawning gravels, which 
can reduce water flow and dissolved oxygen availability to salmonid 
eggs.33 Such reduced flow and oxygen availability can result in a 
“reduced size of embryos at various developmental stages, increased 
development time of alevins, and higher pre- and post-hatching 
mortality.”34 An increase of fine particles in redds can also delay the 
emergence of fry, which may result in “smaller fry that are less able 
to compete for resources.”35 
3. Effects of Heavy Metals 
Suction dredge mining has the potential to introduce toxic, heavy 
metal contaminants into habitats that are critical to spawning and 
early life stages of salmonids.36 A heavy metal of particular concern 
to fish is mercury, which is prevalent in the sediments of many 
California streams due to its historical use in gold mining.37 Mercury 
is also prevalent in the sediments of other western streams that were 
mined for gold.38 One study estimated that approximately half of the 
thirteen million pounds of mercury that was used to process gold in 
California ended up in the state’s waterways.39 The primary form 
found in fish is methylmercury, an organic form of mercury that is a 
neurotoxin.40 Inorganic mercury “can be methylated by microbes to 
form [methylmercury].”41 Methylmercury can then bioaccumulate up 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 4.3-4. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 4.2-3. 
38 CHARLES N. ALPERS ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MERCURY 
CONTAMINATION FROM HISTORICAL GOLD MINING IN CALIFORNIA (Nov. 2005), 
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2005/3014/fs2005_3014_v1.1.pdf; Jerome O. Nriagu, 
Mercury Pollution from the Past Mining of Gold and Silver in the Americas, 149 SCI.  
TOTAL ENV’T 167, 175–77 (1994). 
39 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 18, at 4.2-3. 
40 Id. at 4.3-4; Methylmercury, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://toxics .usgs.gov 
/definitions/methylmercury.html (last modified Feb. 19, 2013). 
41 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 18, at 4.3-4. 
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the food chain—very small aquatic plants and animals take up 
methylmercury, small fish eat these very small plants and animals, 
and larger fish subsequently eat these small fish, with the levels of 
mercury increasing exponentially up the food chain.42 
While studies on the biological effects of mercury on fish are 
limited, those that have been conducted showed that mercury 
contamination has “negative consequences for fish reproduction.”43 
Studies found that fish fed a mercury-contaminated diet show 
decreased spawning activity, a reduction in number of eggs laid, and 
impaired gonadal development, though the “mechanisms by which 
[methylmercury] influences the reproductive physiology of fish still 
remains unclear.”44 Due to the lack of studies investigating the 
potential fitness consequences of methlymercury on fish in a natural 
setting, substantial uncertainty remains regarding how the 
physiological effects of mercury affect the long- and short-term 
fitness of fish.45 
Further, there is a significant data gap regarding the discharge of 
mercury during dredging and the proportion of mercury released from 
suction dredging relative to mercury released through natural 
mechanisms.46 One study attempted to directly quantify the discharge 
of mercury from a suction dredge using a substrate sample from a 
stream known to be a mercury hotspot and found that a suction dredge 
captured ninety-eight percent of the sample substrate’s mercury.47 
However, the two percent of mercury that was released with the 
discharged spoil was at a concentration ten times greater than the 
threshold for hazardous waste designation.48 Mercury hotspots like 
the one used in the study are known to widely exist but little effort has 
been made to map them.49 Natural discharge of mercury from stream 
substrates is “generally episodic and correlates with sediment 
transport in high flow events” but little is known about the actual rate 
of mercury discharge from natural processes.50 
 
42 Id. at 4.2-3; Human Exposure: Moving up the Food Chain, EPA, http://www.epa.gov 
/hg/exposure.htm#3 (last updated July 9, 2013). 
43 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE , supra note 18, at 4.3-4. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 4.2-4. 
47 See id. at 4.2-3. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. at 4.2-4. 
50 Id. 
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4. Egg and Larval Entrainment 
Suction dredging can negatively affect the eggs and early life 
stages of salmonids through entrainment, which—in the context of 
suction dredge mining—refers to the process of an organism getting 
pulled into the suction dredge.51 Though publications are limited, one 
study found the following immediate effects on trout from 
entrainment: one-hundred percent mortality of uneyed eggs (the 
embryo’s developing eyes are not yet visible), thirty percent mortality 
of eyed eggs (the embryo’s developing eyes are visible as a black spot 
inside of the egg), and eighty-three percent mortality of sac-fry 
(newly hatched fish that continue to derive nourishment from the yolk 
sac of the egg from which they were born).52 Additionally, there are 
likely post-entrainment negative effects such as increased risk of 
predation and abrasions.53 
B. Juvenile and Adult Fishes 
Suction dredging has the potential to negatively affect juvenile and 
adult salmonids through entrainment, pool formation and loss, 
sedimentation, loss of large woody debris and boulders, behavioral 
responses, suspended sediment, and cumulative impacts. These 
processes are briefly described below. 
1. Entrainment 
The negative impacts on juvenile and adult salmonids from suction 
dredge mining is likely minimal, as most juvenile and adult salmonids 
are likely to avoid or survive being pulled through a suction dredge.54 
For example, one study found that trout greater than four inches were 
able to avoid entrainment for dredge intake velocities less than one 
foot per second and were generally able to survive entrainment.55 
However, information is lacking for long-term impacts such as 
“disorientation, abrasions, and secondary infections.”56 
 
51 See id. at 4.3-5; see MOYLE, supra note 22, at 52 (discussing entrainment). 
52 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 18, at 4.3-5. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. at 4.3-7. 
55 Id. at 4.3-5. 
56 Id.at 4.3-7. 
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2. Pool Formation and Loss 
Suction dredging can both improve and worsen fish habitat.57 
Excavations from dredging operations can either temporarily form or 
deepen pools, which can have two positive effects.58 First, these pools 
may intersect subsurface flow and create cool-water refugia for fish 
during the summer.59 Second, increased water depth, especially when 
flows are low, can provide a refuge from non-fish predators.60 
However, suction dredging can also fill pool habitat through 
sedimentation, and whether pools that become filled with sediment 
can recover depends on whether the original hydrodynamic conditions 
that led to scour are still or will be present.61 
3. Sedimentation. 
The increase of fine sediment in habitat downstream from suction 
dredging “can negatively impact the microhabitats of bottom-oriented 
stream fish” such as juvenile salmonids because they “rely on cover 
that can become embedded during dredging operations.”62 One study 
“found that high densities of deposited sediment” below dredging 
sites significantly “reduced the amount of instream cover for juvenile 
salmonids because the fine sediment filled gravel interstices and 
decreased streambottom roughness.”63 In another study on juvenile 
salmonids, increased fine-sediment was correlated with decreased 
growth, lower food availability, increased activity, increased 
intraspecific aggression, and an apparent increase in mortality.64 
4. Loss of Woody Debris and Boulders 
The movement of large woody debris and boulders by suction 
dredge operators within stream channels can negatively affect 
juvenile and adult salmonids.65 Suction dredge operators can directly 
move these structural elements or indirectly cause their movement by 
removing the substrate surrounding them.66 The stability and 
 
57 See id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. at 4.3-8. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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maintenance of large woody debris and boulders is important to the 
long-term maintenance of pool habitat, which is important for many 
species of fish.67 More directly, woody debris provides cover for adult 
salmonids.68 Woody debris is an important energy source for benthic 
macroinvertebrates, which are a major food source for juvenile 
salmonids.69 Further, as woody debris is important as a refuge and 
source of macroinvertebrate recolonizers, loss of woody debris can 
decrease macroinvertebrate diversity and production in streams, 
thereby negatively affecting a food source of salmonids.70 
5. Behavioral Responses 
The behavioral responses of fish to noise and vibrations generated 
by suction dredging have not been directly quantified, but studies 
have found a number of negative effects that suction dredging likely 
has on fish behavior.71 Research shows that suction dredging can 
increase salmon movement in pools and thereby increase adult stress, 
especially when numerous dredges are operating in close proximity to 
one another or water temperatures are high.72 Of particular concern to 
the Klamath River and its tributaries is that suction dredging creates a 
“chronic disturbance of fishes, which can change their behavior so 
they move to stream areas with less favorable conditions.”73 The 
Klamath River system can experience water temperatures of seventy 
degrees Fahrenheit and higher; conditions that are stressful or even 
lethal for many salmonids.74 As a response, salmonids, including 
juvenile coho salmon, concentrate in cooler areas where small 
tributaries flow into the Klamath River or where there is an upwelling 
of ground water.75 Disturbing salmonids and causing them to leave 
these thermal refugia, even temporarily, reduces the “overall ability of 
the [Klamath River] to support fish.”76 
 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 4.3-9. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 4.3-10 to -11. 
72 Id. 
73 Moyle, Suction Dredging, supra  note 16. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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6. Suspended Sediment 
Increases in suspended sediment due to suction dredging can have 
a variety of negative effects on juvenile and adult fishes.77 Increased 
suspended sediment can lead to the occlusion of gravel interstices, 
which decreases the hiding places and food available to fish.78 More 
direct effects on fish can include the abrasion or clogging of delicate 
membranes, such as gills; irritation of skin and facilitation of 
infections; and reduced growth rates as a result of limited vision in 
turbid waters.79 However, fish may benefit by actively feeding on 
invertebrates that are entrained in suction dredges and discharged in 
the sediment plume and also by experiencing decreased risk of 
predation due to increased turbidity.80 Further, juvenile and adult 
salmonids may simply avoid the local increases in turbidity that result 
from suction dredging.81 
7. Cumulative Impacts 
No research has focused on measuring the cumulative physical or 
biological impacts of numerous dredges working in close proximity 
or of a stream reach being dredged for many consecutive years.82 In 
many systems “dredging effects may be minor when considered in 
isolation, yet they may contribute to significant cumulative effects on 
important resources.”83 Thus, more research on the cumulative 
physical or biological impacts of suction dredge mining is necessary 
in order for state and federal agencies to make informed decisions 
regarding the regulation of suction dredge mining. 
C. Stream Benthic Communities 
Disturbance caused by suction dredging can have deleterious 
effects on benthic communities (groups of organisms that live on or 
near the bottom of a water body), which subsequently affects higher 
trophic levels such as fish production.84 Benthic communities are 
 
77 CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE, supra note 18, at 4.3-11 to -12. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 4.3-10 to -12. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 4.3-10 to -13. 
83 Id. at 4.3-13. 
84 Id. 
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among the “foundational components of the food web.”85 One study 
found that the richness, diversity, and the absolute number of 
individuals of invertebrate species decreased as disturbance frequency 
increased.86 A number of studies found that direct disturbances to 
benthic invertebrate populations caused by dredging could be extreme 
but that the disturbances were usually relatively temporary and 
limited to the area physically impacted by the dredging activity.87 
Overall, the effects of suction dredging on local benthic invertebrates 
are difficult to measure after just one year of dredging, but as 
dredging occurs over many years, it is more likely to significantly 
affect benthic communities upon which fish rely.88 
Ultimately, a review of the science on the effects of suction 
dredging shows that the activity has real potential to deleteriously 
affect fishes by, inter alia, destabilizing spawning substrate, 
increasing the amount of fine particles in spawning substrate, 
introducing heavy-metal contaminants into spawning habitats, 
entraining eggs and larvae, and creating chronic disturbance of fish. 
The review illuminates just how little is known about the effects of 
suction dredging on salmonids and other fish, as much of the research 
is anecdotal or in non-peer-reviewed reports.89 Hence, Dr. Peter 
Moyle, a highly esteemed fisheries biologist,90 advocates for a 
precautionary approach to allowing suction dredge mining on the 
Klamath River: “[I]n my professional opinion, suction dredging 
should only be allowed in areas where it can be demonstrated there 
will be no immediate or cumulative impact on the anadromous 
fishes.”91 Similarly, the Oregon Chapter of the American Fisheries 
Society “recommend[s] a precautionary approach to suction dredge 
 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 4.3-14. 
88 Id. at 4.3-16. 
89 Peter B. Moyle, Expert Report of Professor Peter B. Moyle, Ph.D., KLAMATH 
RIVERKEEPER 4–7, http://www.klamathriver.org/Documents/Peter-Moyle-Expert-Report   
-on-Suction-Dredging-on-Klamath.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Moyle, 
Expert Report] (prepared on behalf of the plaintiffs in Karuk Tribe v. California 
Department of Fish and Game, in the Superior Court of California, Alameda County, 
RG0521197). 
90 Id. at 1–3. 
91 Id. at 6. 
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mining in Oregon’s waterways.”92 Dr. Moyle also stated that suction 
dredging—as it was being conducted on the Klamath River system 
prior to the Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc decision and California’s 
statutory moratorium on suction dredging—would further contribute 
to the decline of all anadromous fishes in the Klamath basin.93 
III 
BACKGROUND LAW AND REGULATIONS 
A. Endangered Species Act 
“The Endangered Species Act of 1973 [was] the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species 
ever enacted by any nation” at the time it was passed by Congress.94 
In enacting the ESA, it was clear that Congress intended to “halt and 
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”95 The 
following portions of this note discuss sections 4, 7, 9 and 11 of the 
ESA. 
1. Section 4 
Section 4 of the ESA requires the Secretary of the Department of 
Interior to maintain a list of species determined by regulation to be 
endangered or threatened.96 A species includes “any subspecies of fish 
or wildlife, or plants, and any distinct population segment of any 
species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when 
mature.”97 An endangered species is “any species which is in danger 
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” with 
the exclusion of certain insect species.98 A threatened species is “any 
species which is likely to become an endangered species within the 
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range.”99 
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), an agency within 
the United States Department of Commerce, is responsible for 
anadromous fish and most marine species, and the FWS is responsible 
 
92 OR.CHAPTER AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y, supra note 20. 
93 Moyle, Expert Report, supra note 89, at 4. 
94 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). 
95 Id. at 184. 
96 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012). 
97 Id. § 1532(16). 
98 Id. § 1532(6). 
99 Id. § 1532(20). 
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for all other species.100 As a practical matter, the FWS—an agency 
within the United States Department of the Interior—maintains this 
list for all species and can only modify the listing status of species for 
which NMFS has responsibility upon direction from the Secretary of 
Commerce.101 The ESA requires the FWS and NMFS (the Services) 
to evaluate five categories of threats when deciding to list, reclassify, 
or delist a species: “(A) the present or threatened destruction, 
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization 
for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) 
disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its 
continued existence.”102 The ESA further states that listing 
determinations shall be based “solely on the . . . best scientific and 
commercial data available.”103 This language, strengthened and 
clarified by the legislative history behind it, is widely understood to 
prohibit the consideration of economic impacts by the Services in 
deciding whether to list a species.104 
The Services are generally required to designate critical habitat at 
the time of listing to the “maximum extent prudent and determinable” 
and can revise such designation at a later time as appropriate.105 
Critical habitat is defined as specific areas within or beyond the 
geographical areas currently occupied by a listed species that have 
those physical or biological characteristics essential to conservation of 
the species.106 The ESA explicitly requires the Services to consider 
economic impacts when designating critical habitat.107 
 
100 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 3. 
101 16 U.S.C. § 1533. 
102 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E). 
103 Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
104 Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs 
.noaa.gov/pr/listing/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2013); PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL30792, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC 
FACTORS (2003), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crs 
documents/RL30792_04152003.pdf. 
105 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). The other exceptions to critical habitat being designated 
concurrently with the listing of a species are if “it is essential to the conservation of the 
such species that the regulation implementing [the listing decision] be promptly published” 
or “critical habitat of such species is not then determinable.” Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C). 
106 Id. § 1532(5)(a). 
107 Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
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2. Section 7 
Section 7 contains two primary mandates for all federal 
agencies.108 First, section 7(a)(1) directs federal agencies to utilize 
their authority to further the purposes of the ESA by carrying out 
programs for the conservation of ESA-listed species.109 Second, 
section 7(a)(2) (hereinafter Section 7(a)(2)) requires federal agencies 
to ensure that actions they carry out, authorize, or fund are not likely 
to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or 
adversely modify or destroy its critical habitat.110 The Ninth Circuit 
described Section 7(a)(2) as the “heart of the ESA.”111 The Ninth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court have both described Section 7(a)(2)’s 
consultation requirement as a willful decision by Congress to give 
listed species priority over the “primary missions” of federal 
agencies.112 
Agency action must be discretionary to trigger Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation.113 Examples of agency action “include, but are not 
limited to: (a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their 
habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations; (c) the granting of 
licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or 
grants-in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing 
modifications to the land, water, or air.”114 In the Ninth Circuit, 
agency action is construed broadly but is limited to circumstances in 
which a federal agency makes an “affirmative” act or authorization.115 
Federal agencies fulfill this Section 7(a)(2) duty through a process 
that usually begins with the federal agency contacting the Services 
and asking whether any listed species are present in the area where 
the proposed action will occur.116 After this step has been taken, the 
ESA prohibits the action agency and the permit or license applicant 
 
108 Id. § 1536(a)(1)–(2). 
109 Id. § 1536(a)(1). 
110 Id. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012). 
111 W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir. 2011). 
112 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012). 
113 Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666–67 
(2007). 
114 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
115 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1020 (citing Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 472 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
116 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 3; JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
1107 (2d ed. 2012). 
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from making any “irreversible and irretrievable commitment of 
resources” that would limit the implementation of alternatives to the 
proposed action that would not violate Section 7(a)(2).117 Then, if a 
listed species is present, the action agency must conduct a biological 
assessment to determine if the proposed action is likely to adversely 
affect that listed species.118 If the action agency finds through its 
biological assessment that the proposed action is not likely to 
adversely affect the listed species or its critical habitat and gets 
written concurrence from the FWS or NMFS—which Service is 
dependent on which species is present—no further action is 
required.119 
If the action agency issues a biological assessment that determines 
a proposed action would likely adversely affect a listed species, the 
action agency must proceed with formal consultation.120 The formal 
consultation process results in the appropriate Service issuing a 
biological opinion regarding whether the proposed action “is likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of the species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of its critical habitat.”121 If the 
proposed action “reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, 
to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery 
of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, 
or distribution of that species,” then it fails the jeopardy test.122 If the 
proposed action would, directly or indirectly, result in an “alteration 
that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the 
survival and recovery of a listed species,” then it fails the critical 
habitat test.123 The Ninth Circuit held that the Services must consider 
both survival and recovery when analyzing the impacts of proposed 
projects under Section 7(a)(2).124 
There are a number of possible outcomes of a biological opinion. If 
the Service finds that the proposed action will result in jeopardy or 
 
117 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2012). 
118 Id. § 1536(c)(1). 
119 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). 
120 Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 457–58 (9th Cir. 2006). 
121 LAITOS ET AL., supra note 116, at 1108 (internal quotations omitted). 
122 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
123 Id. 
124 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 934 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
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adverse modification of critical habitat, the Service must suggest 
reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs), if they exist, that would 
allow the project to proceed without causing jeopardy or adverse 
modification of critical habitat.125 If the Service issues a “jeopardy” 
opinion, the action agency has three possible courses of action: it 
must abandon the proposed action, implement one of the RPAs, or 
seek an exemption from the Endangered Species Committee.126 If the 
Service finds that the proposed action will not result in jeopardy or 
adverse modification of critical habitat—a “no jeopardy” opinion—
then the action agency may proceed with the proposed action.127 
Biological opinions allowing the proposed actions to proceed, either 
under the RPAs or as originally envisioned, are accompanied by 
incidental take statements that protect the action agency from liability 
for violating section 9 of the ESA.128 
However, following an action agency biological assessment that 
determines a listed species is likely to be adversely affected, the 
action agency may voluntarily initiate a “less rigorous regulatory 
procedure called ‘informal consultation.’”129 Informal consultation 
includes all communication between the Service and the action 
agency and is designed to help the action agency determine whether 
formal consultation will be required.130 Through informal 
consultation, the Service may suggest modifications to the action 
agency’s proposed action that could be implemented to “avoid the 
likelihood of adverse effects to the listed species or critical habitat.”131 
Further, if during informal consultation the action agency gets the 
Service to concur in writing that the proposed action “is not likely to 
adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, [then] the 
consultation process is terminated.”132 
 
125 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 3, at 331; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
126 Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 652 (2007). 
127 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b)(4)(A)–(C). 
128 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 3, at 331; see infra notes 131–36 and accompanying 
text. 
129 Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 2006). 
130 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a) (2012). 
131 Id. § 402.13(b). 
132 Id. § 402.13(a). 
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3. Sections 9 and 11 
Sections 9 and 11 of the ESA set out the Act’s prohibitions on take 
and the mechanisms for enforcing those prohibitions.133 Section 9 of 
the ESA prohibits any person from taking an endangered animal 
within the United States. Take means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in 
any such conduct.”134 A FWS regulation states that harm includes 
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills 
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral 
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”135 A NMFS 
regulation defining harm is phrased almost identically, except that it 
also lists spawning, rearing, and migration as essential behavioral 
patterns.136 The ESA provides a different set of protections for plants, 
defined as “any member of the plant kingdom, including seeds, roots 
and other parts thereof.”137 Knowing violation of the ESA is 
punishable by civil penalty up to $25,000 per violation and criminal 
penalty up to $50,000 and one year of imprisonment per violation.138 
Moreover, the ESA contains a citizen-suit provision that provides for 
the injunction of ongoing violations and recovery of attorney’s fees.139 
B. Mining Law of 1872 and Organic Administration Act of 1897 
The General Mining Law of 1872 (Mining Law) provides that a 
private citizen may enter public lands, not otherwise withdrawn, to 
prospect and mine.140 The Organic Administration Act of 1897 
(Organic Act) extended the applicability of the Mining Law to the 
national forests but also gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power 
to regulate mining activities within the national forests for protective 
purposes.141 Specifically, the Organic Act requires that miners must 
“comply with the rules and regulations covering such national 
 
133 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538, 1540 (2012). 
134 Id. § 1532(19). 
135 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
136 Id. § 222.102. 
137 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(14), 1538(a)(2). 
138 Id. § 1540(a), (b). 
139 DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 3, at 331. 
140 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2012). 
141 16 U.S.C. §§ 482, 551. 
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forests.”142 Extraction of minerals on federal land is also subject to 
regulation by the state in which that federal land is located, as long as 
that state regulation does not contradict federal law.143 
C. USFS Mining Regulations 
In 1974, the USFS promulgated regulations for mining activities in 
national forests in order to minimize the negative environmental 
impacts of such activities.144 Those regulations require all operations 
to be conducted, to the extent feasible, “to minimize adverse 
environmental impacts on National Forest surface resources.”145 In 
2005 the USFS revised its regulations to improve clarity, but these 
changes did not materially affect the issues that were before the Ninth 
Circuit in Karuk Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service.146 The regulations set 
out three different categories of mining, with each category dependent 
on the likelihood that the proposed activity would cause significant 
disturbance to surface resources, such as fisheries and wildlife 
habitat.147 The first category is for de minimis mining activities that 
“will not cause” significant disturbance.148 Such activities may 
proceed without notification of or approval from the USFS.149 
The second category of regulation is for mining activities that 
“might cause” significant disturbance.150 A person proposing such 
activities must submit a notice of intent to operate (NOI) to the 
appropriate USFS district ranger.151 A NOI is only required to include 
information “sufficient to identify the area involved, the nature of the 
proposed operations, the route of access to the area of operations, and 
the method of transport.”152 The district ranger must notify the miner 
whether a Plan of Operation (Plan) for the proposed operation is 
 
142 Id. § 478. 
143 LAITOS ET AL., supra note 116, at 749. 
144 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012); 
National Forest Surface Use Under U.S. Mining Laws, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,317 (Aug. 28, 
1974) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 251, 252, and 293). 
145 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (2013). 
146 681 F.3d at 1013; Clarification as to When a Notice of Intent to Operate and/or Plan 
of Operation is Needed for Locatable Mineral Operations on National Forest System 
Lands, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,713-01 (June 6, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 228). 
147 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1012; 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.4(a), 228.8(e). 
148 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1012; 36 C.F.R. § 228. 
149 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1012; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(1). 
150 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a). 
151 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a). 
152 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a). 
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required within fifteen days of receiving the NOI.153 The district 
ranger will require a Plan if he or she determines that the proposed 
operation “will likely cause” significant disturbance, which 
determination bumps a miner’s proposed activity into the third 
category of regulation.154 The regulations explicitly state that a NOI is 
not required for certain activities, including the following: operations 
that will be limited to the use of vehicles on existing roads, 
prospecting and sampling for minerals which “generally might 
include searching for and occasionally removing small mineral 
samples or specimens,” gold panning, metal detecting, nonmotorized 
hand sluicing, dry washing, and collection of mineral samples using 
hand tools.155 
Proposed activities that “will likely cause” significant disturbance 
require approval of a Plan submitted by the miner.156 A Plan is 
significantly more detailed than a NOI, as it requires “the 
approximate location and size of areas where surface resources will 
be disturbed” and environmental protection measures.157 Within thirty 
days of receiving a Plan, the district ranger must approve the Plan, 
notify the miner that an additional sixty days is required for Plan 
review, or notify the miner of any modifications necessary to meet the 
purposes of the regulations.158 
IV 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Facts 
1. Karuk Tribe, Klamath River, and Coho Salmon 
The Karuk Tribe of California has lived in the region that is now 
northern California “since time immemorial.”159 The government of 
the federally-recognized Karuk Tribe is located in Happy Camp, 
 
153 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(2). 
154 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a). 
155 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(1)(ii). 
156 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(3). 
157 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1012, 1013; 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(c)(2). 
158 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1013; see 36 C.F.R. § 228.5(a). 
159 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1011. 
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California.160 The center of the Karuk world, Katimin, is located at the 
confluence of the Salmon and Klamath Rivers.161 The Karuk Tribe 
relies on coho salmon for a variety of uses, including cultural, 
religious, and subsistence.162 The Tribe is greatly concerned with the 
protection of native fish and wildlife in the Klamath National 
Forest.163 
The headwaters of the Klamath River are in southeastern 
Oregon.164 From there, the river flows through northern California 
and meets the Pacific Ocean about forty miles south of the California-
Oregon border.165 In northern California, the Klamath River flows 
through the Six Rivers and Klamath National Forests.166 The Klamath 
River system supports the highest diversity of sea-run fishes of any 
California river, including coho salmon.167 NMFS designated the 
Klamath River system and much of its riparian habitat as critical 
habitat for coho salmon in 1999.168 
Coho salmon—Oncorhynchus kisutch169—are fairly large fish, with 
adults typically measuring between 55 and 70 centimeters at fork 
length and weighing between three and six kilograms.170 The name 
coho is “derived from a Native American dialect name for the 
species.”171 Coho salmon are anadromous fish, with a fairly strict 
three-year life cycle, about half of which is spent in fresh water and 
half in salt water.172 The Southern Oregon and Northern California 
Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of coho salmon, which includes 
 
160 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 
2005). 
161 Id. 
162 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1011. 
163 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 
164 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1011. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Moyle, Suction Dredging, supra note 16 (those other sea-run fishes are chum and 
Chinook salmon, coastal cutthroat trout, steelhead, eulachon, green sturgeon, white 
sturgeon, Pacific lamprey, and river lamprey). 
168 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1011; Designated Critical Habitat; Central 
California Coast and Southern Oregon/Northern California Coasts Coho Salmon, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 24,049-02 (May 5, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 226). 
169 MOYLE, supra note 22, at 245. 
170 Id. “[Fork length] is the distance from the tip of the snout or lower jaw to the middle 
of the fork of the caudal [tail] fin.” Id. at 79. 
171 Id. at 246. 
172 Id. at 249. 
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coho salmon that utilize the Klamath River, was listed as threatened 
under the ESA in 1997.173 
The Klamath River and its tributaries contain gold.174 Commercial 
gold mining in the rivers and streams of California was suspended 
more than a century ago, due partly to the extreme environmental 
harm that it caused.175 However, small-scale recreational mining has 
continued to the present day, with miners using a variety of methods 
including panning; motorized sluicing, also known as high banking; 
and suction dredging.176 Panning for gold entails working through one 
pan of sand and gravel at a time.177 Motorized sluicing involves 
pumping water into a sluice box located on a stream bank to process 
excavated substrate.178 A sluice box works by trapping a small 
amount of the heavier material, including gold, in the bottom of the 
box as the substrate material is slowed by riffles on its way through 
the box.179 Suction dredging is conducted within the water body itself 
and utilizes a floating unit that includes a gasoline-powered pump and 
sluice box.180 
2. 2004 Mining Season 
Prior to the 2004 mining season, Karuk Tribe representatives 
expressed the Tribe’s concerns regarding the effects of suction dredge 
mining on Klamath River fisheries to the USFS.181 In response, Alan 
Vandiver, district ranger for the Happy Camp District of the Klamath 
National Forest, organized meetings with tribal leaders, miners, 
district officials, and others.182 Additionally, Vandiver met with two 
USFS biologists, Bill Bemis and Jon Grunbaum. The three men 
discussed the issues raised by the Karuk Tribe, and Vandiver 
requested that Bemis and Grunbaum develop recommendations for 
 
173 Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Southern 
Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 
62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (May 6, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227). 
174 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 1012. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 1013. 
182 Id. 
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the 2004 dredging season.183 On May 24, 2004, Vandiver wrote a 
memorandum detailing the discussions that had taken place between 
Vandiver and biologists Bemis and Grunbaum.184 The memorandum 
also explained that the maximum allowable density of operating 
suction dredges would be ten per mile on the Klamath River and three 
per mile on tributaries of the Klamath for the 2004 mining season.185 
At issue on appeal in the Ninth Circuit was the USFS’s approval of 
the four NOIs to conduct mining in the Klamath National Forest over 
which the Karuk Tribe claimed the USFS failed to perform its 
consultation duties under Section 7(a)(2).186 
B. Procedural History 
1. District Court 
On October 8, 2004, the Karuk Tribe filed a Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against the USFS in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California.187 The 
Karuk Tribe later filed an amended complaint, which was dismissed 
without prejudice on January 24, 2005, pursuant to a stipulation 
between the parties.188 In that stipulated settlement, the USFS agreed 
that it violated the ESA and the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) when it approved five Plans during the 2004 mining season; 
essentially, the USFS agreed that it had an ESA consultation duty and 
was required by NEPA to prepare additional environmental review 
documents before approving those Plans.189 
Subsequently, the Karuk Tribe filed a Second Amended Complaint 
on January 31, 2005, which alleged violation of the National Forest 
Management Act, NEPA, and the ESA for allowing mining 
operations to proceed under four specific NOIs.190 On March 1, 2005, 
the New 49’ers and Raymond Koons filed a motion to intervene, 
which was granted on April 26, 2005.191 The New 49’ers is an 
 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1013–14. 
186 Id. at 1011. 
187 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 
2005). 
188 Id. 
189 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1016. 
190 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 
191 Id. 
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organization that provides access to various mining claims in northern 
California and southern Oregon and technical support in exchange for 
paid membership.192 Raymond Koons is an individual who leased his 
unpatented mining claims located near the Klamath River to the New 
49’ers.193 On April 29, 2005, the Karuk Tribe filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment.194 On July 1, 2005, the district court denied the 
Karuk Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment and issued a final 
judgment ruling against the Karuk Tribe on all of its claims.195 
Regarding the Karuk Tribe’s claim that the USFS violated Section 
7(a)(2) because review of a NOI is an authorization of a mining 
operation, the district court set out three reasons for its decision that 
NOI review is not a federal action under Section 7(a)(2).196 First, the 
fact that private entities—the miners—are the ones carrying out the 
mining operations described in the NOI “weighs in favor of a finding 
that the activity is ‘private’ and not ‘federal.’”197 Second, the district 
court explained that a Ninth Circuit case, Sierra Club v. Penfold,198 in 
which the court held that a federal agency’s review of similar mining 
notices is not a federal action under NEPA, weighed heavily in favor 
of finding that the USFS’s review of NOIs is not a federal action 
under Section 7(a)(2).199 Third, the court stated that the miners had a 
statutory right under the Mining Law of 1872 that differentiated their 
mining operations from government authorizations that are 
permissive in nature.200 Finally, the court stated that the Karuk Tribe 
failed to “identif[y] any sufficiently analogous case law that supports 
its argument . . . .”201 
 
192 Master List of Gold Mining Properties, NEW 49’ERS, http://www.goldgold.com 
/master-list.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014); Types of Property, NEW 49’ERS, 
http://www.goldgold.com/types-of-property.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014); Join the New 
49’ers, NEW 49’ERS, http://www.goldgold.com/join (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
193 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. 
194 Id. at 1085. 
195 Id. at 1103. 
196 Id. at 1100–01. 
197 Id. at 1101. 
198 Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988). 
199 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1099–1100. 
200 Id. at 1101. 
201 Id. 
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2. Ninth Circuit Panel 
The Karuk Tribe appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging only 
the USFS’s decision to “accept” the four NOIs without engaging in 
Section 7(a)(2) consultation.202 On April 7, 2011, the Ninth Circuit, in 
an opinion authored by Judge Milan Smith, ruled that the NOI process 
does not constitute agency action for purposes of Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary 
judgment.203 Judge William Fletcher “respectfully but emphatically” 
dissented from the majority’s conclusion and would have granted the 
Karuk Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment.204 
3. Ninth Circuit en Banc 
On September 12, 2011, the Ninth Circuit granted the Karuk Tribe 
an en banc hearing.205 On June 1, 2012, the court reversed and 
remanded the district court’s denial of summary judgment to the 
Karuk Tribe.206 Judge Fletcher wrote the majority opinion, and Judge 
Smith wrote a dissenting opinion.”207 
4. Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari 
On March 18, 2013, the Supreme Court denied the New 49’ers 
petition for certiorari.208 The United States submitted a brief in 
opposition to the New 49’ers petition for certiorari, which stated that 
“[a]lthough the court of appeals’ decision is incorrect, review by this 
court is not warranted because the decision does not conflict with any 
decision of this Court or of any other court of appeals and because the 
practical effect of the decision on future mining operations will be 
limited.”209 The Eastern Oregon Mining Association and the 
 
202 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 640 F.3d. 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2011). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 996. 
205 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 658 F.3d 953, 953 (9th Cir. 2011). 
206 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc). 
207 Id. at 1011, 1030. 
208 New 49’ers, Inc. v. Karuk Tribe of Cal., 133 S. Ct. 1579, (2013) (denying 
certiorari). 
209 Brief for Respondent-United States at 11, New 49’ers, Inc. v. Karuk Tribe of Cal., 
133 S. Ct. 1579, (2013) (No. 12-289) (denying certiorari), available at http://sblog.s3 
.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/12-289-BIO.pdf. 
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Northwest Mining Association filed amicus briefs in support of the 
New 49’ers.210 
The United States’ assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision does 
not conflict with any other court of appeals runs contrary to the 
assertions of the New 49’ers and the amicus briefs, which all argued 
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicted with a case from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.211 
V 
MAJORITY AND DISSENT FROM NINTH CIRCUIT EN BANC 
DECISION 
In analyzing whether the USFS’s approval of the four NOIs 
constituted agency action, the majority examined both the USFS’s 
regulations that apply to suction dredge miners and the pattern of 
conduct between the USFS and NOI applicants and found that the 
USFS was affirmatively authorizing private mining activities.212 
Accordingly, the majority held that the USFS “approved” the four 
NOIs and that this approval constituted discretionary agency action 
within the meaning of Section 7(a)(2).213 Further, the majority found 
that the mining activities approved by the USFS may affect a listed 
species or its critical habitat.214 
In contrast, the dissent found that the USFS’s decision to not 
require a Plan for the four NOIs did not constitute agency action.215 
The dissent determined that NOIs are merely information-gathering 
tools, that the miners have a statutory right to mine under the General 
Mining Act of 1872, and that if an agency has discretion to act but 
decides not to act, there is no agency action under the ESA.216 
Because the dissent determined that there was no agency action by the 
USFS, it did not examine the question of whether the mining 
 
210 The New 49’ers, Inc. v. Karuk Tribe of California, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/the-new-49ers-inc-v-karuk-tribe-of-california/ 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
211 See id. (referencing Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n, 410 F.3d 964 
(7th Cir. 2005)). 
212 Karuk Tribe of Cal. 681 F.3d at 1021. 
213 Id. at 1023–26. 
214 Id. at 1029. 
215 Id. at 1037. 
216 Id. 
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activities approved by the NOIs may affect a listed species or its 
critical habitat. 
A. Majority 
1. Standard of Review 
The court reviewed the USFS’s compliance with the ESA under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides that the 
court may set aside the USFS’s action if the court determines that the 
action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.”217 Because the case concerned the 
interpretation of a statute and regulations outside of the USFS’s 
administration, the court employed a de novo standard in reviewing 
the USFS’s interpretation of the ESA and the regulations promulgated 
by the FWS and NMFS pursuant to the ESA.218 
2. Agency Action 
In addressing the question of whether the USFS’s approval of four 
NOIs to mine in the Klamath National Forest is “agency action” as 
that phrase is used in Section 7(a)(2),219 the court broke its inquiry 
into two distinct parts: first, whether “a federal agency affirmatively 
authorized, funded, or carried out the underlying activity,” and 
second, whether “the agency had some discretion to influence or 
change the activity for the benefit of a protected species.”220 
a. Affirmative Authorization 
The court ruled that the USFS’s regulations require the USFS to 
either affirmatively authorize mining activities under a NOI or reject 
them and require the miner to submit a Plan.221 The court highlighted 
that the NOI regulations require a miner to submit a NOI for proposed 
mining activities, a NOI must be submitted before mining operations 
begin, and the regulations give the USFS fifteen days to notify the 
miner whether the proposed activities may proceed under the NOI or 
whether the miner must submit a Plan.222 The court contrasted the 
 
217 Id. at 1017 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012)). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 1017–21. 
220 Id. at 1021. 
221 Id. at 1021–22. 
222 Id. at 1021 (referencing Clarification as to When a Notice of Intent to Operate 
and/or Plan of Operation Is Needed for Locatable Mineral Operations on National Forest  
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NOI regulations with the regulations governing de minimis mining 
activities, which allow miners who wish to pan for gold to proceed 
without submitting anything to or receiving anything from the 
USFS.223 
The court held that the actions of the USFS and the miners show 
the agency affirmatively authorizes mining activities when it approves 
a NOI and noted specific examples of such actions.224 The letter from 
the district ranger approving the New 49’ers NOI for the 2004 mining 
season stated that the miners may begin their mining operation after 
obtaining all necessary state and federal permits and also stated that 
“‘[t]his authorization expires December 31, 2004.’”225 Letters from 
the district ranger approving six NOIs for the 2010, 2011, and 2012 
mining seasons contained the phrase, “I am allowing your proposed 
mining activities . . . under a NOI with the following conditions.”226 
In another letter in which a different district ranger rejected a NOI for 
the 2004 mining season, the ranger stated that he was “‘unable to 
allow [the] proposed mining operations . . . .’”227 Additionally, the 
court was persuaded by the USFS’s monitoring efforts during the 
2004 mining season to ensure the miners’ compliance with the 
protective criteria set out in the approved NOIs and the USFS’s 
regulation that allows for such inspections.228 The court also noted 
instances from correspondence between miners and the USFS which 
displayed the miners’ understanding that they were seeking 
authorization from the USFS.229 
Next, the court distinguished the NOIs at issue on appeal from 
three significant Ninth Circuit cases involving “private-party 
activities that required no affirmative act or authorization by the 
agency” and therefore did not require Section 7(a)(2) consultation. 230 
In California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. FERC, the court held 
 
System Lands, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,718, 32,728 (June 6, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R pt. 
228)). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 1022. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 1023. 
229 See id. at 1022. 
230 Id. 
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that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) did not 
violate Section 7(a)(2) in deciding not to initiate formal consultation 
because FERC did not take any affirmative action concerning the 
hydropower facility owner’s existing thirty-year license, even though 
FERC could have unilaterally amended the license according to its 
terms.231 The California Sportfishing court stressed that “the agency 
action of granting a permit is complete” and “the ongoing activity is 
that of [the facility owner] operating pursuant to the permit.”232 
In Western Watersheds Project v. Matejko, the court held that the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) did not violate Section 7(a)(2) 
when it failed to regulate vested rights-of-way held by private 
landowners to divert water for irrigation because BLM did not take 
any affirmative action.233 The Matejko court noted that even if the 
BLM could have retained the power to regulate the water diversions 
to protect endangered species, the BLM enacted regulations clarifying 
that the only discretion it retained to regulate pre-1978 water 
diversions like those at issue in the case was if there was a 
“‘substantial deviation in use or location.’”234 There was not a 
substantial deviation in use or location of the water diversions 
challenged in the case.235 
In Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, the court held that the FWS did not 
violate Section 7(a)(2) by failing to initiate consultation with itself 
when the FWS provided private lumber companies with information 
to help those companies avoid taking listed species.236 The court held 
that the FWS did not violate Section 7(a)(2) because the FWS did not 
have discretionary involvement or control over the lumber 
companies’ proposed tree harvest operations.237 
The Karuk court stated that “[t]he private parties in those cases 
were not required to submit proposals to the agency, and the agency 
was not required to respond affirmatively to the private parties.”238 
This, the court held, distinguished those cases from the case before it 
in which the USFS’s regulations and explanations of those regulations 
 
231 Cal. Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2006). 
232 Id. at 598. 
233 W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006). 
234 Id. at 1109–10. 
235 Id. 
236 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 1996). 
237 Id. at 1075. 
238 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc). 
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established that the USFS must decide whether to authorize the 
mining activities in a NOI and “affirmatively notify the miner of its 
decision either way.”239 
The court further supported its assertion that the USFS 
affirmatively authorizes mining activities through NOIs by examining 
Siskiyou Regional Education Project v. USFS.240 In that case, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the USFS’s approval of a NOI to conduct 
suction dredge mining was final agency action under the APA.241 The 
Karuk court said this holding confirms the approval of a NOI is not 
merely advisory but instead “‘marks the consummation of the agency 
decision making process’ and is an action ‘from which legal 
consequences will flow.’”242 
Next, the court addressed the contention put forth by the USFS and 
miners that the mining activities in question are authorized by the 
Mining Law, not by the agency’s approval of the NOIs.243 The court 
noted that private activities often have multiple sources of authority 
and multiple sources of restrictions on that authority.244 The court 
supported this assertion by citing to the FWS and NMFS joint 
regulations for the ESA, which specifically acknowledge that agency 
action under the ESA includes activities authorized “in part” by a 
federal agency.245 The court noted that the Mining Law and Organic 
Act provide “a statutory right, not mere privilege” to miners to enter 
national forests for mining purposes but explained that “Congress has 
subjected that right to environmental regulation.”246 
The court then addressed the USFS’s contention that “approval of a 
NOI is merely a decision not to regulate the proposed mining 
activities.”247 The USFS had buttressed that claim with a 2005 Federal 
Register notice stating, “a [NOI] was not intended to be a regulatory 
 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 1023. 
241 Siskiyou Reg’l Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 554 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
242 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923, 930 (9th Cir. 2010). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
247 Id. 
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instrument.”248 The court, however, pointed out that the relevant test 
under the ESA is whether the agency “authorizes, funds, or carries out 
the activity, at least in part.”249 The court reasserted its position that 
the record demonstrated the USFS authorizes mining activities 
through the NOI process whether or not the USFS considers a NOI a 
regulatory instrument.250 
Finally, the court addressed the contention of the USFS and miners 
that the issue at appeal was controlled by Sierra Club v. Penfold in 
which the Ninth Circuit held that the BLM’s review of “notice” 
mining actions was not a “major federal action” under NEPA.251 The 
court explained that the “major federal action” standard from NEPA 
and the “agency action” standard from the ESA are not 
interchangeable and that the holding in Penfold was that the BLM’s 
review of notice mines was a marginal federal action.252 Thus, the 
court noted that Penfold actually works against the USFS and the 
miners in the present case because a federal action may be 
authorization under Section 7(a)(2) even if it is not a major federal 
action under NEPA.253 
b. Agency Discretion 
The court held that the USFS’s mining regulations and actions 
demonstrate that the decision whether to approve a NOI is a 
discretionary decision through which the USFS can affect the course 
of private mining activities for the benefit of a listed species because 
the USFS made affirmative, discretionary decisions when deciding 
whether to allow proposed mining activities to proceed under NOIs 
with certain protective criteria for fisheries.254 The court noted it had 
previously held that the mining regulation in question grants district 
rangers discretionary authority to decide whether to allow mining 
activities under a NOI.255 Further, the court highlighted that the 
 
248 Id. (quoting Clarification as to When a Notice of Intent to Operate and/or Plan of 
Operation Is Needed for Locatable Mineral Operations on National Forest System Lands, 
70 Fed. Reg. 32,713, 32,728 (June 6, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R pt. 228)). 
249 Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2004)). 
250 Id. at 1024. 
251 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 1025, 1027. 
255 Id. at 1025 (referencing Siskiyou Reg’l Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 
545, 548 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
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“overriding purpose of the mining regulations is ‘to minimize [the] 
adverse environmental impacts’ of mining activities on federal forest 
lands.”256 
3. Mining Activities May Affect a Listed Species or Its Critical 
Habitat 
The second substantive issue before the court was whether the 
mining activities approved by the USFS through the four NOIs may 
affect a listed species or its critical habitat.257 The court noted that 
Ninth Circuit precedent dictates an agency must consult with the 
appropriate Service unless it determines that its action will have no 
effect on a listed species or its critical habitat.258 Accordingly, the 
court stated that agency actions having “any chance” of affecting 
listed species or critical habitat require at least some consultation 
under Section 7(a)(2).259 Here, the USFS conceded that the mining 
activities in question may affect coho salmon or its critical habitat 
while the miners argued that the record did not support USFS’s 
concession.260 The court concluded that the mining activities 
approved by the USFS in this case “may affect” coho salmon and its 
critical habitat because both USFS’s regulatory scheme and the 
scientific evidence in the administrative record showed that this 
standard was met.261 
4. Burden on the USFS 
Prior to its conclusion, the court examined the potential burden that 
its decision would place on the USFS,262 seemingly to address the 
concerns raised in Judge Smith’s hyperbolic dissent. The court 
emphasized that the burden of Section 7(a)(2) consultation on the 
USFS does not have to be severe and could be dispatched with 
informal consultation if the appropriate Service agrees that the 
“agency . . . action is not likely to adversely affect listed species or 
 
256 Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 (2004)). 
257 Id. at 1027–28. 
258 Id. at 1027 (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 
1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 1027–28. 
262 Id. at 1029. 
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critical habitat.”263 And, the court expanded, informal consultation 
can merely entail discussions and correspondence with the 
appropriate Service and does not require the preparation of a costly 
and time-consuming biological opinion.264 The court then compared 
the collaboration between Ranger Vandiver and USFS biologists 
Bemis and Grunbaum to the informal consultation process and noted 
that the process required by Section 7(a)(2) need not look much 
different: Ranger Vandiver would simply need to collaborate with 
biologists from the appropriate Service rather than USFS biologists.265 
In conclusion, the majority held that the USFS was required to 
engage in Section 7(a)(2) consultation because the agency “approved” 
the four NOIs, this approval constituted discretionary agency action 
within the meaning of Section 7(a)(2), and the mining activities 
approved by the USFS may affect a listed species or its critical 
habitat. 
B. Dissent 
1. Poor Gulliver and the Statutory Right to Mine 
Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion begins with a drawing and 
excerpt from the novel Gulliver’s Travels.266 In the drawing, Mr. 
Gulliver is bound by numerous small ropes and surrounded by his 
diminutive but armed captors.267 This drawing, which Judge Smith 
intended to be symbolic of what he thinks the majority opinion has 
done to the USFS, sets the scathing tone that Judge Smith employed 
throughout his opinion.268 The dissent went on to state that “[u]ntil 
today, it was well-established that a regulatory agency’s ‘inaction is 
not action’ that triggers the [ESA]’s arduous interagency consultation 
process,” and that the majority opinion “flouts” a “clear and common 
sense precedent.”269 
After this introduction, the dissent addressed the Mining Law and 
the Organic Act.270 The dissent emphasized language from the 
 
263 Id. at 1029 (internal quotation omitted). 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 1029–30. 
266 Id. at 1030 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. 
268 See id.at 1030–41. 
269 Id. at 1031 (internal quotations omitted) (citing W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 
468 F.3d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
270 Id. at 1032. 
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Organic Act: “[I]ts provisions do not ‘prohibit any person from 
entering upon such national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, 
including that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral 
resources thereof. Such persons must comply with the rules and 
regulations covering such national forests.’”271 The dissent noted that 
upon issuing the mining regulations at issue in the present case, the 
USFS “emphasized ‘that prospectors and miners have a statutory 
right, not mere privilege,’” under the Mining Act and the Organic Act 
to mine in the National Forests.272 Therefore, the USFS did not 
authorize the mining activity, and Section 7(a)(2) consultation was 
not required. 
2. No Agency Action 
The dissent framed the question at issue differently than the 
majority: “whether a []  District Ranger’s receipt of, consideration of, 
and response to a miner’s [NOI] is an agency action that authorizes 
mining activities on national forests.”273 The dissent conceded that the 
USFS has discretion to regulate the NOIs in question274 and did not 
address the question of whether suction dredge mining “may affect” 
coho salmon.275 
In the dissent’s view, the USFS recognized the statutory right to 
mine in National Forests and tailored its regulations accordingly—to 
balance environmental concerns with the miners’ “unique pre-existing 
rights.”276 Then, the dissent explained how it interpreted the 
additional requirements imposed by the USFS in the mining 
regulations depending on whether the proposed activities “will not,” 
“might,” or “will likely” lead to significant disturbance of surface 
resources.277 The dissent describes the NOI, which is required for 
activities that “might” or “will likely” cause significant disturbance, 
as a “straightforward document” requiring miners to list various 
 
271 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 478 (2012)). 
272 Id. (citing National Forests Surface Use Under U.S. Mining Laws, 39 Fed. Reg. 
31,317 (Aug. 28, 1974) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 251, 252 and 293)). 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 1033 n.2. 
 276 Id. at 1032. 
277 Id. at 1033 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a), (a)(1)(v) (2012)). 
HENNES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  11:02 AM 
580 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 545 
information about themselves and their proposed activities.278 
Essentially, the dissent stated that the NOI is an information-gathering 
tool rather than a document used in conjunction with an affirmative 
authorization by the USFS of the miners’ conduct. 
Next, the dissent characterized the majority opinion as asserting 
that the USFS’s “decision not to require a [Plan] for the mining 
activities described in a [NOI] constitutes an implicit authorization of 
those mining activities, therefore equating [USFS]’s ‘decision’ with 
an agency ‘authorization’ under the ESA.”279 The dissent’s problem 
with this is that the USFS’s “explanation of its mining regulations 
establishes that a [NOI] is used as an information-gathering tool” to 
decide whether a miner should file a Plan, not as an “application for a 
mining permit.”280 Accordingly, the ranger’s response to a NOI is 
analogous to the NOI itself, “provid[ing] merely notice of the 
agency’s review decision.”281 The dissent stated that a NOI is not a 
permit and that a NOI fails to impose regulations on private conduct 
the way that a Plan does.282 
In support of its position, the dissent cited to language from a 
clarification published by the USFS in the Federal Register on June 6, 
2005.283 That clarification states that the requirement of submitting a 
NOI before mining commences alerts the USFS of proposed activities 
that the operator believes might cause significant disturbance and 
“gives the Forest Service the opportunity to determine whether the 
agency agrees with that assessment such that [the USFS] will not 
exercise its discretion to regulate those operations.”284 Additionally, 
the clarification says that the NOI was designed to “assist prospectors 
in determining whether their operations would . . . require the filing of 
a [Plan],” and that the 1974 rulemaking record makes it clear that a 
NOI was “not intended to be a regulatory instrument.”285 The dissent 
concluded that the NOI is “merely a precautionary agency notification 
 
278 Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. 228.4(a)). 
279 Id. at 1034. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. (citing Clarification as to What a Notice of Intent to Operate and/or Plan of 
Operation Is Needed for Locateable Mineral Operations on National Forest System Lands, 
70 Fed. Reg. 32,713, 32,720 (June 6, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 228)). 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
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procedure, which is at most a preliminary step prior to agency action 
being taken.”286 
The dissent explained that where the Ninth Circuit has found 
agency action, the agency took an affirmative step that allowed 
private conduct to proceed, and without such a step, the conduct could 
not have occurred.287 In relevant cases where the Ninth Circuit has 
found agency inaction, private conduct was allowed to proceed until 
the agency took an affirmative step to intervene.288 
The dissent then analyzed how the present case compared to 
relevant Ninth Circuit cases, including those cited by the majority. 
The dissent stated that in the present case the conduct of the USFS 
was similar to the conduct of the BLM in Matejko because, like the 
BLM, the USFS made a decision not to regulate the activity in 
question, even though it had the power to do so.289 The dissent also 
compared the present case to Marbled Murrelet, in which the Ninth 
Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) consultation is not required when an 
agency merely advises or consults with a private party.290 Further, the 
dissent cited California Sportfishing, in which FERC took no 
affirmative action and thus failed to trigger Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation, as another similar case.291 The dissent claimed that the 
majority “entirely fail[ed] to distinguish [Matejko] from this case” 
and does not cite any opinion in which conduct such as the USFS’s 
was held to trigger Section 7(a)(2) consultation.292 
Additionally, the dissent claimed that Penfold, a NEPA case, is 
additional persuasive authority that supports its opinion that the USFS 
did not take agency action that triggered the Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation requirement.293 The court articulated that the similar 
notice regulation schemes in Penfold and the current case are “not the 
sort of agency action that require[] environmental compliance.”294 
 
286 Id. at 1035. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 1035–36. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 1037. 
294 Id. 
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Next, the dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on “case-specific 
reasoning” in determining that the district rangers and miners 
evidenced an understanding of the NOI as an “authorization.”295 
Similarly, the dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on the informal 
discussions that miners and district rangers had with each other as a 
mistaken attempt to “characterize such informal discussions as [the 
USFS]’s exercise of discretion to approve or deny [a] NOI.”296 The 
dissent cited Marbled Murrelet for the proposition that such informal 
and voluntary discussions are not examples of agency action.297 
Further, the dissent stated a significant policy concern of the court in 
Marbled Murrelet—that requiring an agency to commence Section 
7(a)(2) consultation for simply advising or consulting with a private 
party would not enhance protection of endangered species—is equally 
applicable in the present case; requiring the USFS to engage in 
Section 7(a)(2) consultation for NOI mining “discourages miners 
from discussing their proposed activities with [the USFS] to 
voluntarily reduce their impact on the environment, and rather 
encourages miners to make their own determination that their 
activities are not likely to ‘cause significant disturbance of surface 
resources’” and thus forego filing a NOI.298 
Ultimately, the dissent concluded, the majority created a new 
category of agency conduct, “implicit agency action,” that is 
purportedly sufficient to trigger Section 7(a)(2) consultation but is 
unsupported by statutes, regulations, and case law.299 
3. The Tirade 
Near its end, the dissent explores what it considers to be the 
massive impact of decisions like the Karuk majority in which the 
Ninth Circuit has misapplied the law.300 The dissent begins what may 
be considered a judicial tirade with a quote from The Divine Comedy, 
“Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.”301 
The dissent claims that the majority has basically shut down the 
suction dredge mining industry in the Ninth Circuit.302 The dissent 
 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 1038. 
297 Id. at 1038–39. 
298 Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a) (2012)). 
299 Id. at 1037. 
300 Id. at 1039. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
HENNES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  11:02 AM 
2013] Ninth Circuit Endorses Functional Approach to 583 
Determining Agency Action Under Section 7(a)(2) 
of the Endangered Species Act 
compares the NOI process, which can allow projects to begin within 
weeks, to the Section 7(a)(2) process, which can delay projects for 
months or years because, due in part to personnel shortages, the 
Services often fail to meet their ninety-day consultation deadlines.303 
Moreover, the dissent says, formal consultation can cost private 
parties large amounts of money because those private parties may 
have to hire outside experts.304 
The dissent says that as a result of the majority’s opinion, “a 
number of people will lose their jobs and the businesses that have 
invested in the equipment used in the relevant mining activities will 
lose much of their value.”305 Further, the dissent notes that eighteen 
percent of the roughly 3,500 miners that obtained suction dredge 
mining permits from California in 2008 received a “‘significant 
portion of their income’” from dredging.306 Subsequently, the dissent 
explains that the majority’s decision is one of many Ninth Circuit 
decisions in which the court breaks from long-standing precedent and 
creates “burdensome, entangling environmental regulations out of the 
vapors.”307 
VI 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The dissent and majority arrive at such drastically different 
conclusions because they seem to be applying different standards of 
review to the USFS’s interpretation of the Services’ joint ESA 
regulations. The majority, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, states 
that the court should defer to an agency’s “interpretation of its own 
regulations and the statutes it is charged with administering [but that] 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute outside of its administration is 
reviewed de novo.”308 In contrast, the dissent does not explicitly 
 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. (citing Justin Sheck, California Sifts Gold Claims, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2012). 
307 Id. at 1040. 
308 Id. at 1017 (majority opinion) (citing Cal. Dep’t of Water Resources v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 489 F.3d 1029, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. 
v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 204 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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explain what standard of review it is applying but places a heavy 
emphasis on the USFS’s interpretation of a NOI as an information-
gathering tool, not as a permit application.309 This deference to the 
USFS’s interpretation of its own regulations is not inconsistent with 
the standard of review applied by the majority. However, contrary to 
the standard of review supported by Ninth Circuit precedent and 
applied by the majority, the dissent lends the USFS substantial 
deference in its interpretation of the Services’ joint ESA regulations. 
The dissent’s reasoning relies on the fact that the USFS asserts the 
NOI is not a permit application but an information-gathering tool. 
This assertion is plausibly supported by the USFS’s regulatory 
scheme for mining. An information-gathering tool or anything like it 
is not among the examples of agency action listed in the Services’ 
joint regulations, such as “granting of licenses, contracts, leases, 
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid.”310 Therefore, 
according to the dissent, the USFS’s administration of its NOI scheme 
is not agency action. 
This chain of logic is flawed in two ways. First, the majority’s 
analysis of the USFS’s NOI scheme correctly explains that the 
scheme is the functional equivalent of a license or permit process 
because the USFS affirmatively authorizes mining activities through 
NOIs. The USFS cannot escape its Section 7(a)(2) consultation duties 
by merely dressing up what is functionally a license or permit as an 
information-gathering tool. The dissent relies heavily on a USFS 
interpretive rule published in the Federal Register on June 6, 2005, 
titled “Clarification as to When a Notice of Intent to Operate and/or 
Plan of Operation Is Needed for Locatable Mineral Operations on 
National Forest System Lands.”311 Based on fact that the USFS 
clarification was published approximately eight months after the 
Karuk Tribe filed its first complaint, this clarification likely represents 
the USFS’s response to the Tribe’s 2004 lawsuit with a post hoc 
recharacterization of the NOI scheme as an information-gathering tool 
without altering the functional parts of the NOI scheme. The 
Services’ joint ESA regulations plainly define promulgation of 
regulations as agency action;312 therefore, had the USFS tried to 
 
309 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1034 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
310 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2004). 
311 Clarification as to When a Notice of Intent to Operate and/or Plan of Operation Is 
Needed for Locatable Mineral Operations on National Forest System Lands, 70 Fed. Reg. 
32,713, 32,720 (June 6, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 228). 
312 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
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change the functional parts of its NOI scheme, it would have been 
required to initiate Section 7(a)(2) consultation with the Services. 
Second, the dissent errs in relying on an illustrative and non-
exhaustive list of examples of agency action to conclude that the 
USFS’s NOI scheme is not agency action. Read in larger context, the 
Services’ joint ESA regulations establish that the Services’ 
interpretation is much broader than the interpretation endorsed by the 
dissent: 
Action means all activities or programs of any kind authorized, 
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in 
the United States or upon the high seas. Examples include, but are 
not limited to: (a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their 
habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations; (c) the granting of 
licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or 
grants-in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing 
modifications to the land, water, or air.313 
The joint regulations and the majority’s functional analysis of the 
NOI process establish that the USFS’s NOI scheme is agency action 
under Section 7(a)(2). 
B. Miners Have a Statutory Right, Not Mere Privilege 
The dissent mistakenly reasons that because the USFS recognizes 
“prospectors and miners have a statutory right, not mere privilege” to 
conduct mining operations in national forests and that its regulations 
for mining in national forests “balance environmental goals with 
miners’ unique pre-existing rights,” the NOI is merely an 
information-gathering tool and administration of the NOI scheme is 
not agency action.314 The dissent explicitly acknowledges that the 
USFS has the authority to regulate mining in national forests, so 
whether it is a statutory right or mere privilege being regulated by the 
USFS is insignificant. As the majority correctly noted, even if the 
Mining Law and the Organic Act give miners a statutory right to 
conduct mining operations in national forests, “Congress has 
subjected that right to environmental regulation.”315 
Further, the USFS has exercised its authority to regulate mining in 
national forests by promulgating the regulations at issue in the case. 
 
313 Id. 
314 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1032 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
315 Id. at 1023 (majority opinion). 
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The fact that the USFS’s regulatory program includes a balancing of 
environmental goals and unique rights simply does not abrogate the 
mandate placed on the USFS by Section 7(a)(2). If it did, protections 
that Congress intended to afford to listed species would be seriously 
compromised. As explained in the background law section of this 
note, the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have 
both described Section 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement as a willful 
decision by Congress to give listed species priority over the “primary 
missions” of federal agencies.316 Therefore, the relevant question for 
whether there is agency action is simply the two-part inquiry laid out 
by the majority: first, whether “a federal agency affirmatively 
authorized, funded, or carried out the underlying activity”; and 
second, whether “the agency had some discretion to influence or 
change the activity for the benefit of a protected species.”317 The 
dissent’s support of a new test in which some categories of 
“discretion to influence or change the activity for the benefit of a 
protected species”318 satisfy the test while other categories of 
discretion do not satisfy the test would severely undermine the 
protections afforded to imperiled species by the ESA. 
C. Misconstructions of Relevant Ninth Circuit Cases 
1. Matejko 
The dissent incorrectly relied on Matejko as support for its opinion 
that the USFS did not affirmatively authorize mining activities 
through NOIs. In Matejko, the court held that the BLM’s failure to 
regulate water diversion rights-of-way that had been granted decades 
earlier was not an agency action requiring Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation.319 Even assuming that the BLM had discretion to 
regulate these rights-of-way—which the court held that the BLM did 
not—the court held that the BLM, in its continuing decision to not 
enforce its regulatory discretion for decades did not affirmatively 
act.320 The USFS’s conduct in Karuk is distinguishable from the 
 
316 Id. at 1020; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978). 
317 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1021; Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 472 F.3d 593, 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2006); Turtle Island 
Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d at 969, 974–75 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
318 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1021. 
319 W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006). 
320 Id. at 1107–09. 
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BLM’s conduct in Matejko: in Matejko there were no federal agency 
regulations requiring the right-of-way holders to submit any sort of 
annual notice to the federal agency prior to commencing activity like 
there were in Karuk; there were no federal agency regulations 
requiring the agency to respond to notices to inform parties whether 
further action would be required of them like there were in Karuk; nor 
was there a record of correspondence or interaction between the 
federal agency and a private actor like there was in Karuk.321 
Other than the legally insignificant similarity that the regulated 
parties in both cases had some type of access rights pursuant to 
nineteenth-century federal laws, the USFS’s NOI scheme is 
fundamentally different than the regulatory scheme in Matejko. 
Accordingly, Matekjo does not properly support the disssent’s 
assertion that the USFS did not affirmatively authorize mining 
activities through NOIs. 
2. Marbled Murrelet 
The dissent erroneously relies on Marbled Murrelet in its assertion 
that the majority was wrong to characterize the discussions that took 
place between the USFS and the miners as an exercise of discretion to 
approve or deny a NOI. In Marbled Murrelet, the plaintiffs sued the 
FWS, arguing that providing advice to private logging companies on 
how to avoid taking listed species under section 9 of the ESA was a 
“federal action” under Section 7(a)(2).322 The court held that the 
record showed no evidence of federal involvement or control of the 
lumber companies’ proposed harvesting operations other than the 
FWS’s authority under section 9 of the ESA to prosecute take 
violations, which is not enough to constitute federal action under 
Section 7(a)(2).323 
The FWS’s conduct in Marbeled Murrelet is similar to the USFS’s 
conduct in Karuk because in both cases the federal agency offered 
advice to private parties; however, that is where the similarity ends. 
Marbled Murrelet is not “directly on point” for Karuk as the dissent 
asserted.324 Rather, as the majority correctly noted, in Karuk—unlike 
 
321 Id. at 1110. 
322 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 1996). 
323 Id. at 1074. 
324 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1039 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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in Marbled Murrelet—the agency had the regulatory power to enforce 
limitations on the private actors’ proposed activity regardless of 
whether an actual take of listed species under section 9 occurred.325 
To simplify the majority’s explanation, in Marbled Murrelet the 
federal agency did not have any authority to regulate whether and 
under what conditions the private action could initially proceed, 
whereas in Karuk even the dissent conceded that the USFS had the 
regulatory authority to dictate whether and how private mining 
activity could initially proceed. The dissent fails to address this 
crucial difference. 
The Marbled Murrelet court also stated that “[p]rotection of 
endangered species would not be enhanced by a rule which would 
require a federal agency to perform the burdensome procedural tasks 
mandated by [Section 7(a)(2)] simply because it advised or consulted 
with a private party.”326 The dissent quoted this language and accused 
the majority of taking the type of action the Marbled Murrelet court 
cautioned against.327 Yet, this quoted language from Marbled 
Murrelet is inapposite to the Karuk case: discussions between a 
federal agency and a regulated entity are part of a broader pattern of 
agency conduct properly considered agency action when a federal 
agency has the authority to regulate whether and under what 
conditions a private action can initially proceed and does exercise that 
regulatory authority. The quoted language from Marbled Murrelet, 
when properly interpreted, is designed to warn against the dangers of 
requiring a federal agency to engage in Section 7(a)(2) consultation 
for advising or consulting with a private party when the agency has no 
authority to regulate whether and under what conditions private 
activity can initially proceed. 
Further, the dissent’s claim that the majority’s holding encourages 
miners to make their own determination whether they need to file a 
NOI and forego discussing with the USFS how to voluntarily reduce 
the environmental impact of their proposed activities328 may be true 
but should not alter the court’s legal analysis. The record in the Karuk 
case and the USFS’s own regulations in effect in 2004 show that were 
a suction dredge miner to forego submitting a NOI, that miner would 
likely be in violation of USFS regulations and subject to enforcement 
 
325 Id. at 1023 (majority opinion). 
326 Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1074. 
327 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1039 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
328 Id. 
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of those regulations.329 The USFS’s regulations specifically state a 
number of mining activities that do not require a NOI and suction 
dredge mining is not one of those stated activities.330 The USFS’s 
2004 regulations state that miners intending to conduct mining 
activities that “might cause significant disturbance” of resources must 
submit a NOI to the USFS.331 While lax enforcement of suction 
dredge mining by the USFS may be a genuine issue and the 
majority’s clarification of the law and regulations would likely 
encourage some miners to break the law to avoid the burdens of 
USFS regulation, neither of these concerns should undermine the 
validity of the majority’s ruling. 
3. Penfold 
The majority and dissent misconstrued Penfold by conflating the 
distinctly different purposes and standards of the ESA and NEPA in 
attempting to square a decision in Karuk with prior Ninth Circuit case 
law. In Penfold, the Ninth Circuit held that the BLM’s review of 
notice mines was not a major federal action that required an 
environmental assessment under NEPA.332 The dissent correctly noted 
the similarity—which the BLM intended333—between the BLM and 
the USFS’s three-tiered mining regulations: the first tier of the BLM’s 
regulations requires no notice or approval; the second tier, for notice 
mines, requires miners to submit basic information at least fifteen 
days prior to commencing mining and the BLM to respond to the 
notice; the highest tier, for Plan mines, requires the BLM to conduct 
an Environmental Assessment under NEPA.334 
The majority incorrectly read Penfold to cut against the USFS and 
the miners. In Penfold, the court held that the BLM’s review of notice 
mines was a “marginal federal action” and thus not a “major federal 
 
329 LAITOS ET AL., supra note 116, at 781 (citing United States v. Goldfield, 644 F.2d 
1307 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
330 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(1) (2004). 
331 Id. § 228.4(a). 
332 Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988). 
333 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1036 (citing Surface Management of Public Lands 
Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902, 78,906 (Nov. 26, 1980) (to be codified at 
43 C.F.R. pt. 3800)) (“[R]egulations were designed to be as consistent as possible with the 
[USFS’s] regulations.”). 
334 Id. at 1036–37; Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1309. 
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action” as is required to trigger NEPA analysis.335 Thus, the majority 
reasoned, under the “more liberal ‘agency action’ standard” of the 
ESA, a federal agency action “need not be ‘major’ to trigger the duty 
to consult. It need only be an ‘agency action.’” 336 
The dissent incorrectly read Penfold to support its opinion in 
stating it “find[s] our previous determination that a similar notice 
scheme was not the sort of agency action that requires environmental 
compliance to be additional persuasive authority.”337 Reducing 
NEPA’s major federal action requirement and the Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation requirement down to “environmental compliance” is 
flawed because it compares the two statutory schemes at too high a 
level of generality. 
Even though the Ninth Circuit described NEPA’s major federal 
action standard and Section 7(a)(2)’s agency action standard as 
“much the same,”338 NEPA and the ESA are fundamentally different 
statutory schemes. NEPA is primarily an informational tool, which 
allows a federal agency to decide “that other values outweigh the 
environmental costs” of a proposed action,339 whereas Section 7(a)(2) 
requires that federal agencies “shall . . . insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out . . . is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence” of a listed species or adversely modify the 
critical habitat of such species.340 Additionally, each statute has its 
own line of case law reaching back decades. Therefore, both the 
majority and dissent stretch Penfold a bit too far to support their 
opinions, which represent the court’s struggle to square a decision in 
the Karuk case with prior case law. 
D. Case-Specific Reasoning 
The dissent’s critique of the majority’s “heav[y]”341 reliance on 
case-specific reasoning to establish that the USFS affirmatively 
authorizes private activity in allowing mining to proceed under a NOI 
is flawed. The majority only utilizes case-specific reasoning to 
buttress its primary finding that the regulatory scheme itself 
 
335 Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1313–14. 
336 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1024 (majority opinion). 
337 Id. at 1036–37 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
338 Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 1996). 
339 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
340 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
341 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1037 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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demonstrates the USFS affirmatively authorizes private activity. 
Before discussing the actions of the USFS and the miners, the 
majority closely examines the USFS mining regulations and 
concludes that “[b]y regulation, [the USFS] must authorize mining 
activities before they may proceed under a NOI.”342 Only after 
making that finding did the majority analyze the pattern of conduct 
between the USFS and the miners that was in the record, finding that 
the “actions of both [the USFS] and the miners in this case accord 
with the understanding that the agency affirmatively authorizes 
mining activities when it approves a NOI.”343 Therefore, what the 
dissent characterizes as a heavy reliance on case-specific reasoning is 
in fact just a thorough illustration of how the USFS’s and miners’ 
conduct supports the majority’s primary finding that the USFS’s 
regulations themselves require affirmative authorization before 
suction dredge mining can proceed under a NOI. 
VII 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE KARUK DECISION 
A. The USFS Will Have to Engage in Section 7(a)(2) Consultation 
for NOIs 
The Karuk decision sets forth a clear mandate that, within the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, the USFS must consult with the Services 
for all mining that requires a NOI under the USFS’s regulations, 
which includes all suction dredge mining in national forests. 
If the USFS does not consult with the Services for NOI mining in 
national forests, it is likely to face lawsuits relying on the Ninth 
Circuit’s Karuk decision. Three environmental groups did in fact file 
such a suit. On October 22, 2012, the three groups, relying on the 
Karuk decision, alleged that the USFS violated Section 7(a)(2) by 
failing to consult with NMFS before approving suction dredge mining 
under NOIs in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest.344 However, 
the case was dismissed on April 23, 2013, for lack of subject matter 
 
342 Id. at 1021 (majority opinion). 
343 Id. at 1022. 
344 Mark Freeman, Coho Protection Focus of Suction Dredge Mining Suit, WESTERN 
ENVTL. LAW CENTER (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.westernlaw.org/article/coho-protection  
-focus-suction-dredge-mining-suit. 
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jurisdiction because the court held that the plaintiffs failed to comply 
with the ESA’s notice requirements.345 
Given the broad range of harms suction dredging can inflict on 
fish, the Ninth Circuit made the right decision to require the USFS to 
consult with the Services for NOI mining. Section 7(a)(2) puts the 
scientific judgment over whether activities may affect a listed species 
or its critical habitat in the hands of the Services, not in the hands of 
other agencies that may have serious conflicts of interest between 
protecting listed species and achieving their primary missions. While 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision will certainly place a greater burden on 
the USFS, it is Congress that truly placed that burden on the USFS in 
passing Section 7(a)(2). Further, Congress can choose to ease that 
burden by either increasing funding to the USFS or amending the 
ESA. Also, as the Karuk majority noted, that burden does not have to 
be severe, as the USFS could utilize informal consultation and work 
with NMFS and miners to modify mining activities in a way that 
would allow NMFS to agree that they are not likely to adversely 
affect listed species or critical habitat.346 
B. All Federal Agencies Will Be Subject to Broader Interpretation 
of Section 7(a)(2) 
The Karuk decision significantly broadens the scope of all agency 
action under Section 7(a)(2) in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, not 
just the USFS’s approval of NOI mining. The Ninth Circuit’s new 
functional approach to determining agency action, categorized by the 
Karuk dissent as implicit agency action, will force federal agencies to 
consult with the Services for agency functions that would not have 
been considered agency action under Section 7(a)(2) before the Karuk 
decision. The dissent from Karuk was correct in stating that the Karuk 
majority sets a new, more stringent standard for agency action under 
Section 7(a)(2) in Ninth Circuit case law, and if federal agencies do 
not comport with this new standard they are likely to face litigation in 
the Ninth Circuit. 
However, a recent decision from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California reveals that the Karuk decision 
might also narrow the definition of agency action under Section 
 
345 Klamath Siskyou Wildlands Ctr. v. MacWhorter, 2013 WL 1751287, at *1–3 (D. 
Or. Apr. 23, 2013). 
346 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 681 F.3d at 1029 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a) (2013)). 
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7(a)(2).347 In that case, the court stated, “to the extent prior cases held 
that ongoing control over a previous agency action is sufficient to 
trigger Section 7’s consultation requirement without any further 
affirmative act, those holdings have been implicitly overruled in 
Karuk Tribe”.348 Then, less than one month later the United States 
District Court for the District of Montana considered that California 
case and “respectfully disagree[d]” that Karuk implicitly overruled 
Pacific Rivers.349 Thus, the true impact of the Karuk decision 
continues to develop. 
C. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management and Conservation Act 
Consultation 
The Karuk decision’s clarification that the USFS’s regulatory 
scheme for NOI mining constitutes affirmative authorization of 
mining activities means that the USFS must now engage in 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management and Conservation Act350 
(MSA) consultation with NMFS before authorizing NOI mining on 
the Klamath River. In 1996, Congress amended the MSA to require 
NMFS to establish new requirements for Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) 
designations in federal fishery-management plans351 and to require 
federal agencies to consult with NMFS for “any action authorized, 
funded, or undertaken . . . by such agency that may adversely affect 
any [EFH]” identified by a federal fishery-management plan.352 The 
MSA defines EFH as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for 
spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity.”353 NMFS’s 
regulations define adversely affect as “any impact that reduces quality 
and/or quantity of EFH.”354 In 1999, the Pacific Fishery Management 
 
347 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 11–cv–00293–JCS, 2013 WL 1729573, at 
*10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). 
348 Id. (referencing Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) and 
Washington Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th. Cir. 2005), as well as other Ninth 
Circuit cases). 
349 Salix v. U.S. Forest Service, No. CV–12–45–M–DLC, 2013 WL 2099811, at *13–
14 (D. Mont. May 16, 2013). 
350 16 U.S.C. § 1801–1891 (2012). 
351 Id. § 1853(a)(7). 
352 Id. § 1855(b)(2). 
353 Id. § 1802(10). 
354 50 C.F.R. § 600.810 (2012). 
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Council designated the Klamath River and various Klamath 
tributaries as EFH for the Pacific salmon fishery.355 
Thus, given the Karuk court’s holding that the USFS’s 
administration of its NOI scheme constitutes an affirmative 
authorization of mining activities and that mining conducted under 
the USFS’s NOI scheme may affect the Klamath River, the USFS’s 
authorization of NOI mining on the Klamath River—which is 
designated as EFH—triggers the USFS’s duty to consult under the 
MSA. 
MSA consultation is much less burdensome than consultation 
under Section 7(a)(2). NMFS’s EFH regulations require that for any 
federal action that may adversely affect EFH, the federal agency 
“must provide NMFS with a written assessment of the effects of that 
action on EFH.”356 The regulations further dictate that the “level of 
detail in an EFH Assessment should be commensurate with the 
complexity and magnitude of the potential adverse effects of the 
action.”357 NMFS’s regulations allow the federal agency to integrate 
its EFH assessment into existing environmental review procedures, 
such as the consultation procedures required by Section 7(a)(2).358 
NMFS’s regulations also allow the federal agency to engage in 
programmatic consultation with NMFS when “sufficient information 
is available to address all reasonably foreseeable adverse effects on 
EFH.”359 
After NMFS receives the federal agency’s written assessment of 
the action’s effects on EFH, NMFS must recommend measures that 
could be taken to conserve the EFH that will be affected by the 
action.360 Following receipt of NMFS’s recommended measures, the 
action agency must respond to NMFS in writing within thirty days.361 
The action agency’s response must include a description of measures 
it proposes for “avoiding, mitigating, or offsetting the impact of the 
activity on EFH,” and if such response is inconsistent with NMFS’s 
recommendations, the federal agency must “explain its reasons for not 
 
355 PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, SALMON FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, 
AMENDMENT 14, APPENDIX A, A7–A8 (May 2000), available at http://www.pcouncil.org 
/wp-content/uploads/99efh1.pdf. 
356 50 C.F.R. § 600.920(e)(1). 
357 Id..§ 600.920(e)(2). 
358 Id. § 600.920(f). 
359 Id. § 600.920(j)(1). 
360 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(4)(A) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 600.920(f)–(J). 
361 50 C.F.R. § 600.920(k)(1). 
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following the recommendations, including the scientific justification 
for any disagreements with NMFS.”362 
While consultation under the MSA for adverse effects to EFH is, 
like NEPA, merely procedural, it has the ability, like environmental 
impact statements, to provide better information to the public and 
political leaders about federal agencies’ management decisions. 
Providing better information about the effects that such decisions 
have on EFH has the potential to produce better substantive outcomes 
for Klamath River coho salmon. 
D. Suction Dredge Mining as One of Many Causes of Coho Salmon 
Decline 
Though suction dredge mining on the Klamath River has the 
potential to cause significant harm to coho salmon and their habitat 
and requiring the USFS to consult with the Services for NOI mining 
will help mitigate that potential to cause harm, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision is unlikely to lead to any immediate recovery of coho 
salmon. NMFS’s 2010 biological opinion for the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of the Klamath Project between 
2010 and 2018 identified a myriad of causes of the coho salmon’s 
decline in Oregon and California—logging, road building, grazing, 
mining, urbanization, stream channelization, dams, wetland loss, 
beaver trapping, hatchery fish, overfishing, water withdrawals, 
unscreened diversions for irrigation, disease, and predation.363 
The broad spectrum of harmful activities that negatively affect 
coho salmon on the Klamath River, and that negatively affect other 
fishes in river systems throughout the West, is likely a significant 
factor in the frustration felt by suction dredge miners over the 
regulations being imposed on them. While there is some merit to the 
miners’ frustration, the proper solution is taking the politically 
difficult steps to address all causes of fisheries declines, rather than 
allowing suction dredge mining to proceed unregulated just because it 
is one harm among many. 
  
 
362 Id. 
363 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: OPERATION OF THE 
KLAMATH PROJECT BETWEEN 2010 AND 2018, 36–37 (Mar. 15, 2010). 
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E. Increased Mining Pressure on Oregon State Lands Outside of 
National Forests 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to subject suction dredge mining in 
national forests to Section 7(a)(2) consultation—combined with 
California’s current statewide, statutory moratorium on suction 
dredging that has been in effect since 2009364 and the rising price of 
gold during the Great Recession365—has the potential to lead to 
increased suction dredge mining pressure on the beds and banks of 
Oregon waters outside of national forests. 
For example, the Rogue River seems particularly susceptible. The 
New 49’ers’ website stated that “within days” of California’s suction 
dredging moratorium going into effect, the club was already planning 
to explore suction dredging opportunities on the Rogue River in 
Oregon.366 A more recent post touted the annual suction dredging 
permit that can be purchased from Oregon’s Department of 
Environmental Quality (ODEQ) for only twenty-five dollars, 
regardless of Oregon residency, and the free permit that can be 
obtained from the Oregon Department of State Lands for dredging 
activities involving “less than 25 cubic yards of removal and fill 
annually in Essential Salmon Habitat streams” but excluding mining 
on state scenic waterways.367 The annual ODEQ permit for suction 
dredge mining is a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit for general water quality discharge that is required 
for compliance with the federal Clean Water Act.368 The Oregon 
Department of State Lands Permit is required by Oregon statute, 
 
364 CEQA Findings of Fact, CAL. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/suctiondredge/. 
365 Zach Urness, Suction Dredge Reform Bill Passes Legislature, CASCADIA 
WILDLANDS (July 8, 2013), http://www.cascwild.org/suction-dredge-reform-bill-passes     
-legislature/ (originally published in the Salem Statesman Journal). 
366 Dave McCracken, New 49’ers Discover High-grade Gold Dredging on the Rogue 
River in Southern Oregon, NEW 49’ERS, http://www.goldgold.com/new-49a%C2%80 
%C2%99ers-discover-high-grade-gold-dredging-on-the-rogue-river-in-southern-oregon-2 
.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
367 Dave McCracken, We Have Established High-grade Dredging on the Rogue River!, 
NEW 49’ERS (July 2010), http://www.goldgold.com/741.html; Application for 700-PM 
General Permit, OR. DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq 
/wqpermit/docs/general/npdes700pm/application.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2014); 
Recreational Placer Mining, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF STATE LANDS, http://statelands 
online.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Placer.Apply (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
368 Water Quality Permit Program–Metal Mining Activities, OR. DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/wqpermit/mining.htm (last visited Feb. 
8, 2013). 
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which states that “a person may not remove any material from the bed 
or banks of any waters of this state or fill any waters of this state 
without a permit issued under the authority of the Director of the 
Department of State Lands” and “[r]emoval or filling activities 
customarily associated with mining require a permit” from the 
Department of State Lands.369 “Waters of this state in this context 
means all natural waterways, tidal and nontidal bays, intermittent 
streams, constantly flowing streams . . . [and] all other navigable and 
nonnavigable bodies of water in this state.”370 
In 2010, the Oregon State Land Board, after completing a study 
that determined that the federal test for title navigability was satisfied, 
declared ownership of all lands below the ordinary high water mark 
for an eighty-nine mile stretch of the Rogue River: from river mile 
68.5, Grave Creek, to river mile 157.5, Lost Creek Dam.371 The 
consequences of such a determination are that these new lands owned 
by the Oregon State Land Board would potentially be open to suction 
dredge mining. As further evidence of this potential for increased 
pressure on the beds and banks of Oregon waterways outside of 
national forests, there was a two hundred percent increase in the 
number of suction dredge miners permitted by ODEQ from 2011 to 
2012.372 
In response to this increasing pressure, a number of Oregon Senate 
Bills were introduced to increase protections of Oregon’s rivers from 
suction dredge mining.373 On August 14, 2013, Governor Kitzhaber 
signed Oregon Senate Bill 838 into law.374 Senate Bill 838 
acknowledges that “[b]etween 2007 and 2013, mining that uses 
motorized equipment in the beds and banks of the rivers of Oregon 
increased significantly, raising concerns about the cumulative 
 
369 OR. REV. STAT. § 196.810(1)(a), (b) (2011). 
370 Id. at 196.800(14) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
371 OR. DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP OF THE ROGUE RIVER 
BETWEEN RIVER MILES 68.5 AND 157.5 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.oregon.gov 
/dsl/NAV/docs/web_rogue _study/rogue_declaration.pdf. 
372 Protect Oregon’s Rivers from Suction Dredging!, ROGUE RIVERKEEPER, 
http://rogueriverkeeper.org/get-involved/take-action/protect-oregons-rivers-from-suction   
-dredging (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
373 Id. 
374 Senate Bill 838: Measure Activity, OREGONIAN, http://gov.oregonlive.com/bill 
/2013/SB838/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
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environmental impacts”375 and sets out a number of other provisions: 
First, it requires the Department of State Lands to limit the individual 
suction dredge mining permits issued to “not more than 850 permits 
and authorizations for [motorized mining] at any time” during the 
period of January 1, 2014, to January 2, 2021. Second, it imposes 
certain conditions on the use of motorized mining from January 1, 
2014, to January 2, 2016, including requiring a minimum distance of 
500 feet between dredges unless otherwise allowed by the ODEQ, 
prohibiting unattended equipment, and limiting the allowable hours of 
operation to between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.376 Third, it sets out a 
moratorium—subject to certain exceptions—from January 2, 2016, 
until January 2, 2021, on “mining that uses any form of motorized 
equipment for the purpose of extracting gold, silver or any other 
precious metal from placer deposits of the beds or banks of the waters 
of [Oregon]” within the “spawning habitat in any river and tributary 
thereof in [Oregon] containing essential indigenous anadromous 
salmonid habitat . . . or naturally reproducing populations of bull trout 
. . . .”377 This prohibition applies 100 yards perpendicular to the line 
of ordinary high water of rivers or tributaries thereof containing 
essential indigenous anadromous salmonid habitat or naturally 
reproducing populations of bull trout.378 Fourth, it allows ODEQ to 
increase the fees for the annual NPDES permit required for suction 
dredge mining to cover the costs of administration, compliance, 
monitoring, and enforcement related to the permit and imposes a 
surcharge of $150 on every annual NPDES permit for suction dredge 
mining to fund data collection and reporting on suction dredge mining 
in Oregon by ODEQ.379 Finally, it directs the governor’s office and 
affected agencies—such as Department of State Lands and ODEQ—
study and consider changes to the current system for regulating 
motorized mining and draft a legislative report with proposed 
regulatory framework along with necessary legislation and funding on 
or before November 1, 2014.380 
 
375 S.B. 838, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2013 Or. Laws 783, § 1(5) (2013). 
376 Id. § 5. 
377 Id. §§ 2-5. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. §§ 11-12. 
380 Id. § 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s Karuk decision may be a controversial and 
bold step forward in ESA case law, but it is legally supportable and 
provides necessary protection for endangered species. Congress 
passed Section 7(a)(2) to force federal agencies, which may be highly 
committed to their primary statutory missions, to consult with the 
Services for their actions. The body of peer-reviewed science, though 
riddled with significant gaps, overwhelmingly indicates that suction 
dredge mining is capable of causing harm to salmonids and 
specifically, coho salmon. The USFS’s NOI mining regulations, and 
its administration of those regulations, exemplify the type of agency 
action that Congress intended to require Section 7(a)(2) consultation. 
The overarching purpose of the ESA is to recover species so that they 
may be delisted: requiring federal agencies to engage in Section 
7(a)(2) consultation for their actions, even those that may only be 
considered functional or implicit agency actions, aligns with this 
purpose. 
The Supreme Court’s denial of the New 49’ers petition for 
certiorari was a massive step in solidifying the impacts that the Ninth 
Circuit’s Karuk decision will have. Federal agencies operating in the 
Ninth Circuit—which may have been waiting for the Supreme 
Court’s decision to decide whether to follow the Karuk court’s more 
stringent mandate—will likely begin to follow that mandate and will 
face litigation from environmental interests if they do not. 
Finally, the Karuk Tribe is almost certainly more interested in 
recovering coho salmon on the Klamath River than it is in winning 
lawsuits. The Ninth Circuit’s Karuk decision, though significant, is a 
small part of broader efforts to recover coho salmon on the Klamath 
River. The Klamath Basin’s history has shown that litigation alone is 
incapable of resolving the Basin’s systemic conflicts.381 
In light of these intractable conflicts, in 2010 an incredibly diverse 
group of Klamath Basin stakeholders came together and agreed on a 
massive settlement package that seeks to restore Klamath Basin 
 
381 See generally E. Bayley Toft-Dupuy, Recent Development, The Ovidian Water 
Drop: Negotiations in the Klamath Basin, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. (forthcoming Mar. 
2014). 
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fisheries while providing for sustainable agriculture.382 The Karuk 
Tribe’s Natural Resources Director said that the settlement package is 
the “only approach that can restore salmon runs while benefitting 
Klamath Basin agriculture.”383 A report conducted by the United 
States Geological Survey states that there is a high degree of certainty 
that removal of four Klamath River dams—as part of the settlement 
package—would benefit coho salmon.384 However, that settlement 
package is contingent upon funding from the United States Congress 
that has not yet materialized—estimates of the federal costs to 
implement the settlement package over the next fifteen years range 
from 536 to 798.5 million dollars.385 The original settlement package 
was set to expire if it failed to get congressional authorization by 2012 
but that deadline has now been extended to 2014. Accordingly, 
though there have been dark days on the Klamath for the Karuk Tribe, 
coho salmon, and farmers, there is cause to believe in a bright future 
for all of the basin’s stakeholders. 
 
382 See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET. AL., KLAMATH DAM REMOVAL OVERVIEW 
REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 5 (2012), available at 
http://klamathrestoration.gov/sites/klamathrestoration.gov/files/2013%20Updates/Final%2
0SDOR%20/0.Final%20Accessible%20SDOR%2011.8.2012.pdf. 
383 Damon Arthur, Klamath Basin Restoration Pact Extended Two Years, REDDING 
RECORD SEARCHLIGHT (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.redding.com/news/2013/jan/01 
/klamath-basin-pact-extended-two-years/?print=1. 
384 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET. AL., supra note 382, at 17. 
385 CHARLES V. STERN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42158, KLAMATH BASIN 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES IN BRIEF 7 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org 
/sgp/crs/misc/R42158.pdf. 
